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Executive Summary  
Effective international cooperation can enable the world to (i) develop along a 
pathway that provides a reasonable chance that global average temperatures 
will not increase by more than 2°C above pre-industrial levels; and (ii) adapt to 
the climatic changes already locked-in as a result of past and ongoing 
greenhouse gas emissions. It can also help countries seize the many 
opportunities and benefits associated with the transition to a low-carbon 
economy; to achieve an attractive form of inclusive growth that is sustainable. 
The United Nations climate change conference in Paris at the end of 2015 is 
an important opportunity to advance toward those objectives.  
The French Government, which will host the Paris summit, has indicated that 
it will seek a ‘Paris Climate Alliance’ as an outcome, based on four aspects: a 
universal legal agreement, applicable to all countries; national commitments 
covering control and reduction of emissions; a financial and technology aspect 
aimed at scaling up finance and technology for climate change mitigation and 
adaptation while guaranteeing international solidarity with the most vulnerable 
countries; and an ‘Agenda of Solutions’ aimed at implementing accelerators to 
ensure more ambitious progress, above and beyond binding commitments. 
The legal agreement that is emerging is a “hybrid” agreement, involving a mix 
of centralised and decentralised, binding and non-binding elements. The 
agreement will be associated with ‘intended nationally determined 
contributions’ (INDCs) by countries to restrain and reduce emissions, the 
achievement of which will be non-binding internationally. The agreement is 
also likely to involve centralised, common processes to ensure the 
transparency of countries’ efforts and, it is widely hoped, a review-and-
revision process for countries to increase the ambition of their commitments 
regularly over time (e.g. every five years). Yet, many obstacles remain on the 
road to Paris, and on the longer pathway toward an effective and equitable 
response to climate change.  
This paper examines: (i) certain critical matters of which a shared 
understanding needs to be built if successful climate cooperation is to occur; 
and (ii) the key goals, principles, policies and institutions for action and 
collaboration on climate change, and how these can be embedded in the 
Paris agreement and associated efforts. 
International agreements are built on shared understanding. It is important 
that all parties understand certain key characteristics of the problem we face 
and the opportunities and benefits that lie in possible responses: 
 In order to be on a pathway that will plausibly not lead to global 
warming of more than 2°C, annual global emissions of greenhouse 
gases need to fall from their current levels of around 51 gigatonnes (Gt) 
of carbon-dioxide-equivalent (CO2e) to about 35Gt in 2030, below 20Gt 
in 2050, and roughly zero (or “net zero”), emissions before the end of 
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this century — ‘net negative’ emissions may be required by mid-century 
if annual emissions are higher than this. 
 Analysis of recent commitments from many countries, including the 
United States, European Union and China, suggests that, if these 
commitments are implemented, global annual emissions in 2030 will be 
significantly lower than under a ‘business as usual’ scenario. 
Notwithstanding this positive message, a significant gap — potentially 
of about 20–25Gt — is very likely to remain between the benchmark 
emissions reductions needed in 2030 (around 35Gt CO2e) and the 
aggregate emissions reductions by 2030 implied in the pledges 
countries submit toward the Paris agreement. 
 Countries should recognise the likely size of the gap and work hard to 
raise the ambition of their pledges as much as possible before the 
December Paris conference. Assuming there will be a residual gap, 
post-Paris, pledges should be understood as initial contributions to an 
ongoing process of raising ambition over time toward the ultimate goal 
of net zero emissions within the second half of this century. Indeed, the 
pledges should be understood to be more than mere statements of 
emissions targets. Many INDCs will, and all should, also articulate the 
domestic policy and regulatory frameworks that will underpin the 
achievement of a transition to a zero carbon economy. 
 There is a strong case already for fostering cities, energy systems and 
land-use systems that involve low pollution, low congestion and low 
waste, and that could deliver a stronger and more attractive economic 
growth through innovation and resource efficiency. This kind of sound 
decision-making in countries’ own interests will be good for the climate. 
However, in some cases, there will be a residual need for measures 
primarily justified by the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
Over time, the costs of pursuing the ‘sound’ path will fall and the 
benefits will grow, thanks to the dynamics of learning and discovery, 
the scaling of new innovations, and the effects of new networks, norms 
and institutions. As such, the incentives countries have to reduce 
emissions will become even stronger over time. It is thus sensible and 
realistic to have an international process that acknowledges the 
dynamic nature of the transition, and facilitates the scaling-up of 
ambition over time. 
 Yet we must also understand that there are barriers to this kind of 
sound decision-making. Many of these barriers are technical — 
institutional, regulatory, financial or technological. Others are political 
and distributional: the costs and benefits of structural change are 
distributed unevenly, and adverse impacts on particular groups, 
including groups with vested interests in the status quo, can have 
political effects that hinder the process of low-carbon transition. Others 
still are ideational — old norms and values die hard. 
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Based on this shared understanding we suggest the following goals, 
principles, policies and institutions to guide international climate cooperation: 
 International climate cooperation should be organised around: (i) the 
long-term objective of achieving net zero emissions within the second 
half of this century, as detailed in the G7 Communique, which is 
necessary for holding warming to within 2°C; and (ii) associated 
medium-term goals including the decarbonisation of electricity by mid-
century and, well before mid-century, the phasing out of unabated coal-
fired electricity generation. Clear articulation of such goals — in 
international agreements and statements — can help to set investor 
expectations about the long-term, zero-carbon direction of global and 
national economic development; 
 Given these goals, and understanding the associated transition as 
involving many opportunities and benefits quite aside from reduced 
climate risks, it is appropriate to interpret the principle of equity 
(contained in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change) of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities” (CBDR) in a dynamic, collaborative, and opportunity-
focused way. The idea of “Equitable Access to Sustainable 
Development”, which builds on CBDR and was embedded in the 
agreement at COP16 in Cancun (2010), captures these ideas well. 
 Moreover, the Paris agreement should contain, in addition to these 
goals and principles, dynamic elements that enable ambition to be 
raised over time, including a regular (e.g. five-yearly) review-and-
revision process. 
 Countries should also be encouraged and assisted to develop domestic 
institutions, laws, policies, and political configurations that are 
conducive to: increasing ambition; seizing opportunities for better 
growth; and implementing commitments effectively. Two key areas for 
institutional development are finance (for mitigation and adaptation) 
and innovation. 
 On finance, around US$6 trillion per year will need to be spent globally, 
and mostly in developing and emerging market countries, on 
infrastructure over the next 15 years. With the right kind of institutions 
and policies in place, that finance can flow to resource-efficient, low-
pollution, low-congestion, energy-secure, low-carbon and climate-
resilient infrastructure. Multilateral development banks, state 
development banks and “green investment banks” are important 
institutions that can reduce the cost of capital for such projects. The 
meeting in Addis Ababa in July this year on financing for sustainable 
development was an important step on the way to mobilising the 
financial flows required to meet the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) and wider sustainable development needs. The climate finance 
being mobilised through the UNFCCC/Paris process (aiming towards 
support from the richer countries for poorer countries of US$100 billion 
per year by 2020) should be structured in a way that is complementary 
to the SDG finance (further enhancing the sustainability aspects of the 
latter) and that is additional to it. 
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 The case for individual countries to support low-carbon innovation is 
generally very strong, yet clean innovation is currently badly 
underfunded and underdone around the world. International 
coordination on low-carbon innovation should include: a coordinated 
scale-up of national expenditure on research and development; new 
public-private regional networks for the development and 
demonstration of new and locally-adapted technologies and processes; 
scaled-up public venture capital for innovative clean technology firms; 
and better global coordination of clean energy deployment support. 
The prize of successful international climate cooperation is a much more 
attractive and dynamic form of economic growth and development that 
creates a much healthier environment for people everywhere, overcomes 
poverty, and can be sustained over the long term. An agreement in Paris can 
play a very important role in signaling to the world that this is the future 
direction of the global economy, and in accelerating concrete initiatives to 
achieve it.  
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1. Introduction  
In late 2015, representatives of close to 200 national governments and tens of 
thousands of civil society observers will come to Paris for the 21st Conference 
of the Parties (COP21) to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC). It is widely hoped that this will be the conference 
at which a new international agreement is negotiated, setting out how 
countries will cooperate to tackle climate change, with a particular focus on 
the post-2020 period. The conference presents an important opportunity to 
advance global cooperation toward the urgent task of reducing global 
emissions of greenhouse gases and adapting to the impacts of climate 
change. 
The purpose of this paper is twofold: (i) to set out certain critical matters of 
which a shared understanding needs to be built if successful climate 
cooperation is to occur (Part 3); and (ii) to propose certain key goals, 
principles, policies and institutions for action and collaboration on climate 
change, and explain how these can be embedded in the Paris agreement and 
more generally (Part 4). First, by way of background, we briefly describe the 
basic model and key features of the climate agreement that is likely to emerge 
in Paris, and identify some of the obstacles that could inhibit a successful 
outcome (Part 2). 
2. The road to Paris: directions and obstacles 
a) Directions 
The Paris COP is the next major event in a long history of such meetings, 
beginning in the early 1990s. The UN climate process has resulted in: the 
establishment of the UNFCCC (a framework agreement that mostly sets out 
broad principles, but with some commitments on emissions reporting); the 
more detailed, prescriptive, and centralized and Kyoto Protocol, whose first 
commitment period ended in 2012; the less centralized and non-binding 
Copenhagen Accord/Cancun decisions in 2009/2010, which record climate 
change targets for individual countries to 2020; and the Durban process, 
beginning in 2011, which set in train the process of agreeing a post-2020 
framework by the end of 2015. 
The French Government, which will host the Paris summit, has indicated that 
it will seek a ‘Paris Climate Alliance’ as an outcome, based on four aspects: a 
universal legal agreement, applicable to all countries; national commitments 
covering control and reduction of emissions; a financial aspect guaranteeing 
international solidarity with the most vulnerable countries; and an ‘Agenda of 
Solutions’ aimed at implementing accelerators to ensure more ambitious 
progress, above and beyond binding commitments. 
The ongoing negotiations toward the first two aspects of this package can be 
thought of as a “hybrid” framework that mixes legally binding and non-binding 
elements, centralised and decentralised elements, based partly on a 
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pragmatic assessment of what has worked better, and what less well, in 
previous international agreements (Bodansky and Diringer 2014). Specifically, 
there will likely be a central, universally applicable, legally-binding agreement, 
and this will be associated with ‘intended nationally determined contributions’ 
(INDCs) by countries to restrain and reduce emissions, the achievement of 
which will be non-binding internationally.  
Under this hybrid model, while the central agreement would be formally legally 
binding, the provisions within it relating to the key issue of greenhouse gas 
emissions control and reduction would merely be obligations of 
process/conduct, obliging participating parties to, for example, submit, and 
record (e.g. in an ancillary document) a nationally-determined emissions 
reduction commitment — typically a quantified target — and perhaps also to 
adopt and implement policies and measures with a view to achieving their 
quantified commitment.1 But the substance of those commitments will be 
“nationally determined” and the agreement is not likely to contain an 
internationally legally binding obligation on parties to achieve their quantified 
commitment per se.2  
While many think that a superior outcome would be a more centralised 
regime, entailing legally-binding and enforceable obligations to achieve an 
internationally-negotiated domestic target, this is not necessarily the case, all 
things considered (IPCC 2014, ch 13; Green 2014). Participation in 
international processes and agreements is voluntary on the part of states, and 
different countries have different motivations and capacities for  such 
participation. In current circumstances, we think a more flexible approach has 
helped, and will continue to help, increase engagement in the process 
(encouraging both participation in the agreement and greater ambition in 
commitments) by some of the most important countries (e.g. the United 
States, China and India), whereas a more centralised, legalistic, enforcement-
oriented agreement would likely have alienated them (Green 2014; Stern 
2014a). 
On the other hand, some of the other centralised institutional elements in 
existing UN agreements have worked relatively well and could usefully be built 
upon in a new agreement. For example, there is widespread support among 
parties for a common framework, agreed rules and some centralised 
institutions, concerning the accounting, monitoring, reporting and verification 
(MRV) of countries’ emissions. Moreover, many parties support the inclusion 
in the agreement of a long-term shared goal (or goals), and centralised 
                                            
1
 A similar approach is expected with regard to adaptation and financial support (i.e. from 
developed countries for both mitigation and adaptation in developing countries), i.e. there may 
be obligations of process with regard to formulating national adaptation plans and financial 
strategies: see Morgan et al. (2014). 
2
 This “nationally-determined” approach was agreed at COP19 in Warsaw and affirmed at 
COP20 in Lima. One suggestion as to how to achieve the non-binding aspects of the 
agreement that has attracted considerable interest is to record countries’ commitments in a 
separate, non-binding document, such as a schedule to the main agreement. See, e.g., New 
Zealand (2014) and United States (2014). 
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processes and mechanisms to prompt higher ambition from parties over time3 
(which we discuss further below). Such elements would enable a greater 
degree of coordination and interaction among Parties than under the 
Copenhagen/Cancun model (Bodansky and Diringer 2014). 
b) Obstacles 
Yet many obstacles remain on the road to Paris, and on the longer pathway 
toward an effective and equitable response to climate change. Most 
prominently, it is very likely that there will remain a significant gap between the 
aggregate of national commitments pledged toward the Paris agreement and 
those consistent with plausible 2°C pathways, meaning commitments will 
need to be ramped-up in subsequent years. There are also concerns about 
how credible the non-binding pledges will be, necessitating an increased 
focus on the domestic (institutional, legal, policy and political) arrangements 
affecting the ability of countries to deliver on their commitments and to scale 
them up over time. And there are concerns over how equitable the agreement 
in Paris will be, and whether particular developed and developing countries 
are contributing equitably to the response to climate change.  
Equity concerns have been particularly prominent in discussions of climate 
finance (and, to a lesser extent, non-financial forms of support) within the 
UNFCCC and could pose a challenge to reaching agreement in Paris. And yet 
these discussions focus on only a small part of the overall challenge of 
financing sustainable development over the next two decades — a key issue 
in tackling the two great challenges of this century, ending poverty and 
mitigating and adapting to climate change.  
Finally, innovation in zero-carbon technologies and processes will be crucial 
to addressing these twin challenges, and yet inadequate investment in 
innovation hampers society’s ability to do so.  
3. The scale and pace of global action 
Bearing in mind the likely shape of the Paris agreement, and the obstacles 
that stand in its way, we now turn to setting out what we see as the key 
elements of successful international climate cooperation, in Paris and 
beyond.4  
                                            
3
 Again, it is envisaged by many that these institutionalised processes could extend not 
merely to emissions reduction commitments, but also processes for reporting on, and scaling-
up over time, adaptation and financial support: see Morgan et al. (2014). 
4
 When we are arguing that something should be in the Paris agreement itself, or could be 
advanced “on the side” of the Paris conference, we will refer to Paris explicitly.  
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a) Understanding the mitigation task 
The first key to succeeding in international climate cooperation is to properly 
grasp the problem and understand what a successful response to it would 
ultimately require. 
In 2014, global emissions were around 51GtCO2e (Boyd et al. 2015a).
5 Figure 
1 shows the IPCC’s (2014) modelling scenarios of various emissions 
concentration pathways, with the blue scenario representing pathways 
consistent with a “likely” (>66%) probability of holding to within 2°C (430–
480ppm CO2e pathway). 
Figure 1: Representative emissions pathways for alternative mitigation scenarios 
 
Source: GCEC (2014a) based on IPCC (2014, SPM, Figure SPM.4) 
The IPCC estimates the remaining “carbon emissions budget” consistent with 
2°C trajectories as being in the region of 1,000–1,500GtCO2 emissions. To a 
rough approximation, this is equivalent to forty years of global CO2 emissions 
at the present annual level.6 However, this budget would be exhausted well 
before that time if the long-term trend of accelerating annual emissions 
                                            
5
 The EU, US and China account for around 46% of global emissions (23GtCO2e in 2014). 
The next major contributions come from Asia (without China) with 16%, and Africa and 
Eastern Europe/Eurasia on 9%. 
6
 See IPCC (2013, ch 12). Note that there is a subtle interplay between probabilities of 
reaching certain trajectories (e.g., a chance of at least 50% or 66%) and accurate 
measurements of CO2 emissions levels and its equivalents. Also bear in mind that data 
limitations restrict us to calculating “CO2 budgets” as opposed to “CO2 equivalent budgets.” 
CO2 is the most important driver of radiative forcing, the gas that is easiest to measure, and is 
long-lasting in the atmosphere.  
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continues. Indeed, global emissions of around 50GtCO2e into the 2030s could 
lock in temperature increases of around 3.5°C or more. 
By contrast, it can be seen from Figure 1 that, in order to be on a plausible 
2°C pathway, emissions should be: 
 Around 35GtCO2e in 2030;
7  
 20GtCO2e or below in 2050; 
 Roughly zero (or “net zero”8), and possibly net-negative, before the end 
of the century.9  
Cutting global emissions from around 50GtCO2e to 20Gt or below in 2050 is a 
cut by a factor of 2.5. Suppose also that world output were to grow by a factor 
of three over the period 2013 to 2050 (given an annual growth rate of around 
3%). Under these assumptions, emissions per unit of output would have to be 
cut by a factor of 2.5 × 3 (i.e., by a factor of around 7 or 8) by 2050.  
Emissions reductions on this scale imply a transition across society and the 
economy on a scale that would be appropriately described as an “energy-
industrial revolution” (Stern 2015a). 
b) Understanding the likely size of the Paris mitigation “gap” 
It is very likely that there will be some gap between the Intended Nationally-
Determined Contributions (INDCs) pledged by countries in 2015 for the 
purpose of the Paris agreement and the emissions reductions needed by 
2030 to stay on a plausible 2°C pathway.  
Recent announcements by a number of major emitters, including China,10 the 
US,11 and the EU12 are major steps in the right direction. However Boyd et al. 
                                            
7
 The IPCC pathway range is roughly 28–50GtCO2e in 2030. We prefer to use a 2030 
benchmark of about 35–36GtCO2e: 35Gt is roughly the mid-point between the 10
th
 percentile 
and median values given by the IPCC in its 2°C pathway range, since this requires less 
reliance on ambitious assumptions about the potential for negative emissions technologies in 
the second half of this century. See also UNEP (2014) which analysed model projections that 
limit global warming to less than 2°C (50–66% chance) but do not assume that net negative 
carbon dioxide emissions from energy and industry occur during the 21
st
 century. These 
pathways have a median value of 36GtCO2e in 2030. 
8
 This reflects the reality that there are likely to be some anthropogenic emissions sources in 
sectors where emissions are difficult to eliminate altogether, and hence a need to offset these 
with expanded emissions sinks (e.g. from the land sector). 
9
 Leaders at the G7 summit in Elmau in Germany in June this year acknowledged that we 
must reach zero emissions of carbon dioxide in the second half of this century. See Part 4 for 
more information. 
10
 Chinese President Xi Jinping announced in November 2014 China’s commitment to peak 
CO2 emissions by around 2030, with the intention of peaking as early as possible, and to 
raise the non-fossil-fuel share of primary energy consumption to around 20% by 2030 (from 
the current level of ~10%). 
11
 President Obama announced a target for the US of reducing their emissions by 26-28% by 
2025 compared with the 2005 level. 
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(2015a) concluded that based on these three announcements, the total INDCs 
submitted ahead of COP21 are unlikely to result in aggregate emissions that 
are consistent with the 2°C goal; a significant gap is likely to remain.  
As of 20 July 2015, 46 Parties to the UNFCCC, including the 28 Member 
States of the European Union, had submitted INDCs.13 These 46 Parties were 
together responsible for 58% of global annual emissions of greenhouse gases 
in 2011.14 Boyd et al. (2015b) estimated the level of emissions in 2030 by 
constructing a global ‘business-as-usual’ (BAU) scenario and then modifying 
the result to account for the emissions implied by the 46 INDCs (no 
modifications from BAU were made to the trajectories of the countries that 
have not yet submitted an INDC). They find that the BAU scenario, which 
results in around 64GtCO2e by 2030, is reduced by around 5–7 GT when the 
scenario is modified to account for the 46 submitted INDCs, resulting in total 
emissions of around 57–59Gt in 2030.15 While this divergence from BAU is 
welcome, it suggests that the INDCs submitted so far are not consistent with a 
2°C path, being 21–23Gt above the 36GtCO2e 2030 benchmark calculated by 
UNEP (2014).16 
There are many uncertainties associated with these calculations. 
Nevertheless, it is essential that countries recognize the (rough) size of this 
gap and hence the need for the Paris INDCs to be seen as initial contributions 
to an ongoing process of raising ambition over time.  
c) Understanding the dynamics of transition  
i) The benefits and opportunities 
The transition to a low-carbon economy is part of a much larger set of 
processes of structural transformation that will characterize the global 
economy over the next two decades. These include: continued change in the 
balance of economic activity towards emerging market and developing 
countries; continued global population growth and urbanization (a projected 
9.5 billion people on the planet and 6–7 billion of these in cities by 2050); and 
technological revolutions in information and communication technologies, 
materials, and biotechnology. Amid these changes the world must also tackle 
ongoing and growing challenges of poverty, inequality, macroeconomic 
imbalances, ongoing problems in the financial sector, structural adjustment to 
                                                                                                                             
12
 The leaders of the countries of the European Union decided at the European Council of 
23/24 October 2014, to reduce emissions by 40%, 1990-2030 on the basis of domestic action. 
13
 INDCs that have been submitted to the secretariat of the UNFCCC are published at: 
http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx. 
14
 WRI (2014). 
15
 See Boyd et al. (2015b) for more information. For a different approach that focuses on the 
INDCs of the US, EU and China, see Boyd et al. (2015a), and see Green and Stern (2015) for 
detailed discussion of China’s likely trajectory.  
16
 This gap is derived from on a snapshot of emissions based on submitted INDCs. As more 
INDCs are submitted, this snapshot, and the resulting gap, will likely change. 
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technical and economic change, and grave pressures on natural resources, 
local environments and biodiversity.  
The opportunities for tackling climate change alongside these other unfolding 
changes and challenges are profound. For example, the Global Commission 
on the Economy and Climate (2014a) estimates that between now and 2030, 
the world will need to spend around US$6 trillion per year over the next 15 
years on infrastructure — primarily in cities and energy systems, and primarily 
in the major emerging economies — for reasons other than to address climate 
change. The capital costs of this infrastructure, assuming it were to consist of 
incumbent (high-carbon and high-pollution) technologies and processes — 
“unsound” investments, in other words — would cost cumulatively around 
US$89 trillion to 2030. However, if “sound” investment decisions were made 
— using low-carbon, low-pollution, resource-efficient technologies and 
processes — the capital cost would be around US$93 trillion, and the 
additional capital expenditure would be more than offset by savings in 
operational costs (e.g. renewable energy infrastructure has lower operating 
costs since fossil fuels do not need to be purchased). Factor in the unpriced 
co-benefits of following the “sound” investment path — including greater 
energy security, and lower local pollution, congestion and waste — and it will 
be more attractive on economic, social and environmental grounds than the 
unsound path, before the climate mitigation benefits have even been 
considered (GCEC 2014a, 2015; see also Green 2015). 
This general, global conclusion is extremely important. It means that countries 
will generally have strong local incentives to be ambitious — and increasingly 
so over time — in their efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, 
irrespective of what other countries do (GCEC 2014a; 2015).17 To the extent 
this holds, it is more accurate to describe decisions that reduce emissions as 
opportunities to be seized, not as burdens to be allocated or avoided 
(Averchenkova et al. 2014; GCEC 2014a; Green 2014, 2015; Stern 2014a, 
2014b, 2015a). 
Moreover, these costs and benefits are not static; they are changing all the 
time in response to factors such as the dynamics of learning and discovery, 
the scaling of new innovations, and the effects of new networks, norms and 
institutions. Innovation and scale (and their interdependence) hold especially 
great potential for further reducing the costs of clean technologies (Aghion et 
al. 2014; GCEC 2014a; Stern 2015a). An excellent example of the dynamism 
                                            
17
 The Global Commission on the Economy and Climate finds that 50–90% of the emissions 
reductions needed to put the world on a plausible 2°C pathway by 2030 would be net 
beneficial. This is based on achieving the median value of the IPCC’s scenarios for holding to 
2°C with a “likely” change, under which global emissions fall to 42Gt per year by 2030, 
relative to the IPCC’s business-as-usual baseline scenario, under which global emissions 
reach 68Gt by 2030 (see IPCC 2014, SPM, Figure SPM.4; NCE 2015). There will of course 
remain some actions necessary to reduce emissions that are not, at the time they need to be 
taken, locally net-beneficial, i.e. actions that do need to be justified primarily by their 
contribution to global change mitigation. This may be the case for some highly traded, carbon-
intensive goods, for example (see Green 2014, 22). 
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of this kind of structural change is the advances made in solar photovoltaic 
(PV) energy installations. Extensive innovation and learning in solar PV have 
driven rapid cost reductions that have far exceeded forecasts. Solar PV 
module prices declined from around US$2,800 per watt (W) in 1955, to 
around US$100/W in the 1970s. Since then, the change has been 
remarkable: installed costs have fallen more than 50% since 2010 to around 
US$0.60–0.90/W currently (IEA 2014b). The cost of energy that can be 
delivered from these devices is competitive (i.e. without the need for 
subsidies) in perhaps 79 countries (Stern 2015a).  
Concerted innovation in zero/low-carbon technologies is likely also to produce 
beneficial knowledge spillovers that drive growth in other sectors (see Aghion 
et al. 2014). Empirical evidence suggests that low/zero-carbon innovation 
produces significantly more knowledge spillovers than innovation in 
incumbent, high-carbon technologies, and many of these spillover benefits 
accrue to the local economy (Dechezleprêtre et al. 2013, 2014). For many 
countries, therefore, a strong focus on clean innovation provides a pathway to 
medium- to long-term growth and prosperity (Perez 2010; 2013; Mazzucato 
and Perez 2014; Stern 2015a). It is the unleashing of this innovative capacity, 
through sufficient global action to reduce emissions, that would likely stimulate 
an energy-industrial revolution or major wave of technological change, and 
“experience of previous such changes suggest they are associated with 2 or 3 
decades, or more, of investment, innovation and growth” (Stern 2014c). 
For all of the above reasons, we can reasonably expect the technology, 
economics, and politics of mitigation to become more favourable over time, 
meaning countries will find it increasingly feasible and desirable to increase 
their ambition.18 This effect, moreover is likely to be self-reinforcing, leading to 
“tipping” dynamics that ultimately produce new — low-carbon — path 
dependencies in technologies, institutions, political-economy patterns and 
social norms (Aghion et al. 2014; Green 2015; Heal and Kunreuther 2012).  
ii) The barriers 
But the process of reaching these desirable tipping points has been slow-
going. There are many immediate, local barriers and challenges that often 
prevent the sound medium- and long-term decisions from being made. Many 
features of our technical, economic, political and social systems emerged in a 
high-carbon era where natural resources were (or were treated as if they 
were) effectively unlimited. These systems are subject to their own inertia and 
path dependencies that are difficult to dislodge. A useful way to think about 
the challenges of climate change mitigation in the short term is therefore to 
focus on removing barriers that, once removed, would accelerate the onset of 
the desirable tipping dynamics referred to above. 
                                            
18
 For a developed country expression of this position, see: United States (2014); Stern, T. 
(2014). Todd Stern, the US Special Envoy on Climate Change, said recently that “because we 
see both political will and technology development increasing over time, we think the target 
we could put forward for 2030 five years from now will be measurably higher than a 2030 
target we could put forward now. So we don’t want to see low ambition locked in for 2030.” 
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Many of these barriers are institutional, regulatory, financial or technological 
— and these are often significant and intertwined. For example, investments 
in low-carbon infrastructure tend to be sensitive to the cost of capital because 
they tend to be more capital-intensive than high-carbon infrastructure, hence 
the need for policy and institutional reform, discussed below in Parts 4(d)–(e). 
Moreover, even where low-carbon technologies would be lower-cost than 
higher-carbon incumbents, policy and regulation may unduly favour the latter, 
or there may be institutional or capacity constraints that prevent the low-
carbon technologies from being deployed (GCEC 2014a). Well-designed and 
credible institutions, laws and policies are essential preconditions for ensuring 
that finance and technology are deployed in the most sound way. 
Other barriers are distributional and political. Sound policies and investments 
will still have costs, even if the costs are exceeded by the benefits. And the 
way these costs and benefits are distributed matters greatly in political terms: 
the ‘losers’ from decisions that favour low-carbon outcomes will often be 
concentrated in particular industries or sectors (e.g. fossil fuel industries and 
energy-intensive industries); and those sectors tend to be economically and 
politically powerful and have a vested interest in avoiding potential losses, and 
can mobilise effectively to block or dilute low-carbon reforms. Moreover, there 
are often legitimate concerns about the short-run impacts of structural reform 
on some households, workers and some communities, particularly those least 
able to manage them. The best response is to ensure that reform processes 
and policy packages are structured so that they are transparent, inclusive of 
under-represented interests, and equitable. In poorer countries especially, this 
means designing policy reform packages that also help reduce poverty as well 
as emissions. A further precondition of sound decision-making is thus an 
attentiveness to configurations of interest and power, and to questions of 
legitimacy and equity. 
iii) Implications for international cooperation 
Understanding these dynamics of transition helps to clarify where international 
cooperation could make a significant difference in accelerating national 
emissions reductions. Cooperation is needed, among other reasons: to help 
the finance and technology flow to the best projects, and to improve domestic 
institutions to that end; to ensure the processes and outcomes of this 
transition are equitable and legitimate; to generate political momentum for 
domestic reforms and counterweight the political power of vested interests; to 
spur innovation and cost reductions in new technologies and processes, and 
their adaptation to local circumstances; and finally to provide direct incentives 
for mitigation in residual areas where local costs continue to outweigh the 
local benefits (i.e. the minority of cases where the global climate benefits of 
action become decisive in local decision-making) (Green 2015). 
In sum, the above logic — the logic of ambition, opportunity, dynamism, and 
collaboration — should permeate analysis and decision-making on climate 
change mitigation. It applies equally to decision-making in the UNFCCC as it 
does to other areas of international climate cooperation. In the following 
sections, we carry this understanding into discussions of specific suggestions 
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about how international climate cooperation in Paris and beyond can be 
structured so as to overcome short-term barriers, and ramp-up countries’ 
ambition over the next decade (and beyond).  
4. Goals, principles, policies and institutions for 
action and collaboration 
a) Framing the mitigation task: appropriate long-term and 
medium-term goals 
i) Net Zero emissions in the second half of this century 
The “2°C goal” agreed by countries in Cancún at COP16 in 2010 is valuable, 
but its implications are not readily understood by most people.19 As noted 
above, the most plausible pathways for achieving the 2°C goal require that 
global emissions be reduced to roughly zero before the end of this century. It 
is also a goal that is relatively easy for people everywhere to understand. This 
is important given that clear goals in international agreements can help to set 
public and investor expectations about the long-term, low-carbon direction of 
the global economy.20 
Accordingly, the notion of phasing out emissions to “net zero” has received 
considerable support from leading experts,21 business leaders, civil society 
and nearly 120 countries.22 Likewise, we see strong merit in countries 
agreeing — in the Paris agreement and more generally — to a shared goal to 
reduce emissions to net zero within the second half of this century Recently, 
the major G7 economies called for “a common vision” and support of “the 
upper end of the latest IPCC recommendation of 40 to 70% reductions by 
2050 compared to 2010 recognizing that this challenge can only be met by a 
global response” including that we must decarbonise emissions of carbon 
dioxide in the second half of this century (G7 2015, 15). It should be 
understood that developed countries are expected to reduce emissions to 
zero more quickly than developing countries, and provide appropriate 
examples and support (equity is discussed further below).  
  
                                            
19
 Indeed, in and of itself it has no clear implications, since different emissions trajectories 
imply different probabilities of holding within 2°C. 
20
 More generally: effectively framing the objectives of climate mitigation will increase the 
likelihood that those goals will affect the expectations and decisions of relevant agents 
(GCEC 2014a, 280; Morgan et al. 2014, 2; Gauri 2012). 
21
 Including OECD Director-General Angel Gurría (2013); UNFCCC Executive Secretary 
Christiana Figueres (2013); the Global Commission on the Economy and Climate (2014a, 
280); Haites et al. (2014); and Morgan et al. (2014). 
22
 See PWCLG (2014) and The B Team (2015) (business community), and Track Zero (2015) 
(civil society and governments). 
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ii) Decarbonising electricity by mid-century 
Given that in some sectors it will prove more difficult to drive emissions to 
zero, others will have to go to zero (or negative) well before the end of this 
century. Countries should therefore think strategically about the sequencing of 
their plans for phasing out emissions. Taking such a strategic approach 
enables medium-term goals to be set that are consistent with the long-term 
net zero emissions goal. 
Decarbonizing the electricity sector is the most urgent priority for 
decarbonizing the global economy (Fankhauser 2012; IDDRI/SDSN 2014).23 
As the UK experience of strategic decarbonisation planning is demonstrating 
(see, e.g., Committee on Climate Change 2013), it is reasonable to look to 
developed countries to decarbonize their electricity sectors well before the 
midpoint of this century — by perhaps 2030 or 2040 — and in so doing fueling 
the innovation and cost-reductions in key technologies that will enable 
developing countries to follow closely behind them (Green 2014; Stern 
2015a).  
We see value in articulating this medium-term goal in the Paris agreement, 
though it could also be agreed among a smaller grouping of countries. 
iii) Phasing out coal 
Within efforts to decarbonise electricity, there is a strong case for international 
cooperation specifically to phase-out unabated coal (GCEC 2014a; Collier and 
Venables 2014). Coal is the single largest contributor to global greenhouse 
gas emissions from energy.24 If the world is to reduce emissions in line with 
the 2°C goal, only a small fraction of the world’s remaining fossil fuel reserves 
can safely be burned, and the economic case is strongest for phasing out coal 
first within the ‘burnable’ margin (Nelson et al. 2014; Collier and Venables 
2014; IDDRI/SDSN 2014). Moreover, as the Global Commission on the 
Economy and Climate surmised, “pollution from burning coal is a contributor 
to the estimated 3.7 million premature deaths each year from outdoor air 
pollution, and coal production also causes ill health, injuries and deaths” 
(GCEC 2014a, 300). And despite the fact that these effects cause economic 
damages well in excess of the market price of coal in many countries, as the 
International Monetary Fund has recently demonstrated, coal remains very 
lightly taxed in many parts of the world (Parry et al. 2014; Coady et al. 2015). 
                                            
23
 This is for several reasons: first, power generation is a major source of GHG emissions in 
most countries; second, low-carbon power generation is well understood and feasible, with 
many options available and costs coming down rapidly; and third, decarbonized electricity has 
an important role to play in reducing emissions in other sectors, especially transport (through 
battery-powered electric vehicles and rail), residential heating (through, for example, ground 
source and air source heat pumps), and some parts of industry. 
24
 Coal combustion generated 44% of global CO2 emissions from energy in 2011 (oil 35%; 
gas 20%; other 1%): IEA (2013a). 
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As such, substituting away from coal would bring many attractive economic, 
fiscal, public health and environmental benefits to countries, quite aside from 
benefiting global climate efforts (GCEC 2014a).  
For these reasons, the Global Commission on the Economy and Climate has 
argued that high-income countries should commit now to end the building of 
new unabated coal-fired power generation and accelerate the early retirement 
of existing unabated capacity, while middle-income countries should aim to 
limit new construction now and halt new builds by 2025 (GCEC 2014a, 301). 
Since political and technical barriers are the main reasons for continued 
investment in coal-fired power generation,25 international cooperation to 
declare these medium-term goals could play a valuable normative/signalling 
role, helping to catalyse local efforts to phase out coal by adding to the 
existing pressures to so from numerous sources (Green 2014).26 But goals 
targeting the demand side — the phase-out of coal-fired generation — will, for 
well-understood economic reasons, not be sufficient: strong action will also be 
needed to restrict the supply of coal (Collier and Venables 2014; Sinn 2008, 
2012). Accordingly, the recent initiative of President Anote Tong of Kiribati 
calling for a global moratorium on new coal mines and mine extensions is an 
important initiative.27 
Again, we see value in articulating medium-term goals along these lines in the 
main Paris agreement, though in practice this is unlikely to happen in 2015. 
Initiative on these issues is more likely to come from a smaller coalition of 
committed countries, from which further endorsements and participation could 
grow. In this regard, the fourth aspect of the Paris process, which is focused 
on generating deeper commitments on specific issues among smaller groups 
of willing countries — along with sub-national governments, companies and 
civil society groups — would be the ideal setting in which to articulate, and 
build cooperative initiatives around, these important medium-term goals. 
b) Equity 
Questions of equity and justice are intrinsically and instrumentally important in 
the international climate negotiations. If Paris is to be successful, countries will 
need to carry into the discussions a shared understanding of what a 
reasonably equitable approach to climate change would look like, and the 
empirical matters on which such an approach is predicated.  
                                            
25
 When the full costs and benefits are considered, energy efficiency and zero/low-carbon 
power generation sources are likely to bring greater local net-benefits than building new coal-
fired power plants in many parts of the world: see GCEC (2014a, chs 1, 4–6) for discussion. 
26
 These existing pressures include: domestic policy pressures, from Washington to Beijing, in 
the form of increased direct regulation of coal-fired power plants; social campaigns for fossil 
fuel divestment, and local activism against new fossil energy projects across the world; and 
economic pressures from investors increasingly concerned about the risk of stranded assets: 
see, e.g., Gore and Blood (2014). 
27
 See http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/HEs-letter.pdf.  
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Insofar as equity relates to mitigation, we have argued that a great deal of the 
transition to a low-carbon economy is rightly characterized as a beneficial 
opportunity for countries to improve their economies and societies in the 
context of dynamic changes in technologies, prices, institutions and norms; 
and that the benefits multiply through collaboration. Equity discussions 
regarding mitigation should be predicated on this shared understanding. It is 
false and misleading to characterize equity discussions as being entirely, or 
even mostly, about sharing “burdens” (Averchenkova et al. 2014; Stern 
2014a, 2014b). 
This framing allows us to interpret the principle, enshrined in the UNFCCC, of 
“common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” in a 
dynamic, collaborative, and opportunity-focused way. A promising way 
forward is to embrace the twin ideas of:  
(i) rich countries embarking on a dynamic and attractive transition to low-
carbon and climate-resilient economies in their own societies, involving 
strong and early emissions cuts, and strong examples; and  
(ii) developing countries undergoing a similar transition, along a sustainable 
development pathway of their choosing, shaped by their own 
characteristics and endowments, where that transition is supported by 
finance, technology and know-how from developed countries and the 
private sector as a result of the latter’s earlier/faster transition.  
As Stern (2014a, 2014b) has argued, this is one way in which the idea of 
“equitable access to sustainable development” (EASD), proposed by India 
and adopted in the UNFCCC agreement at COP16 in Cancún in December 
2010, could be interpreted and revived.  
c) Dynamic elements of the Paris agreement 
In the context of the expected “emissions gap”, success in Paris will depend 
largely on whether the new agreement contains elements that create 
pressures to scale-up ambition in the years following the Paris COP. These 
elements could usefully include:28 
 Clear long- and medium-term shared goals, based on climate science, 
including of the kind discussed above in Part 4(a); 
 Recognition of the gap between those goals and the commitments 
pledged under the agreement at that point in time (see above Part 
3(b)), and provision for a regular, science-based assessment of 
aggregate emissions embodied in existing commitments and 
comparison with emissions reduction pathways for 2°C and 1.5°C; 
 Acknowledgement that the Paris agreement is intended to be a 
dynamic instrument, embodying a shared expectation that parties’ 
commitments must rise over time in order to bridge the emissions gap, 
                                            
28
 For further discussion of these kinds of elements, see Bodansky and Diringer (2014); 
GCEC (2014a, ch 8); Green (2014); Stern (2014a).  
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and therefore that their 2015 INDCs are to be treated as starting points 
or minimum commitments, to be revised upwards over time; 
 Encouragement of parties to adopt domestic institutions, laws and 
policies that can be expanded over time as conditions for reducing 
emissions become more favourable, and to explain how these enable 
the achievement of their INDCs and the progressive raising of ambition; 
 Encouragement of parties to submit long-term decarbonisation plans 
soon after the Paris conference; 
 A mechanism for a regular (e.g. five-yearly) major review of 
commitments at which time all parties are expected to raise the 
ambition of their commitment; and 
 Recognition in the agreement of diverse and significant contributions 
made by agents that are not parties to the agreement (e.g. subnational 
governments, cities, businesses) and the potential that exists for these 
agents to raise their ambition over time and in turn facilitate greater 
ambition by parties. 
d) Domestic institutions, policies, and politics 
An important catalyst for countries to raise their ambition over time is the 
presence of domestic institutions, laws, policies, and political configurations 
that are conducive to ever-greater ambition. In light of the above discussion 
about the opportunities and net-benefits associated with many low-carbon 
options, and the short-term barriers that block such sound decision-making, it 
will be important that countries: 
 Develop new, or utilise existing, state development / green investment 
banks to lower the cost of capital for low-carbon infrastructure 
(discussed further below in relation to finance); 
 Develop nationally-appropriate institutions for zero-carbon innovation 
(see below discussion in relation to innovation); 
 Undertake nationally-appropriate reforms to improve the domestic 
investment climate and so lower the cost of capital for low-carbon 
projects and facilitate technological innovation (including adaptive 
innovation); 
 Design and sequence low-carbon policies and institutions in ways that 
take account of the politics and political-economy of structural 
transition. This includes, for example, analysing the winners and losers 
from planned low-carbon policy reforms and developing packages of 
reforms that: create mutually-reinforcing incentives in favour of low-
carbon activities; ensure distributional outcomes are equitable (e.g. 
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pro-poor); and enable wide coalitions of support for the reforms to be 
developed.29 
The INDCs present an excellent opportunity for countries to explain to the 
world how they will lay these domestic foundations for moving to a zero-
carbon, sustainable economy. Insofar as they do, INDCs should be viewed as 
going beyond mere statements of intended emissions targets. 
e) Finance for sustainable development 
i) The financing task 
As noted earlier, the Global Commission on the Economy and Climate 
(2014a) estimates that around US$6 trillion per year will be spent globally on 
infrastructure over the next 15 years and this can be spent in a sound, low-
carbon way (at slightly higher capital cost but with lower operational costs and 
greater co-benefits), or in an unsound, high-carbon way. Since most of this 
infrastructure needs to be built in emerging and poorer economies, it is 
particularly important to consider how the requisite finance can be mobilized, 
and what role international cooperation (in Paris and beyond) can play. 
Financial support for sustainable development in poorer countries (which are 
generally the most vulnerable to climate change) can promote better growth 
by creating healthier, more liveable and efficient cities; cleaner, more reliable 
and secure energy systems; and well managed and rehabilitated land, forests, 
and natural resources (GCEC 2014a) — all of which is at the core of 
sustainable development and poverty reduction (Stern 2015a). Better, cleaner 
economic growth and sustainable development can reduce the risks of climate 
change by cutting GHG emissions through efforts to lower traffic congestion 
for instance, or to improve local air pollution and to be less wasteful. But it 
should also be complemented and reinforced through climate finance to 
support additional adaptation and mitigation.  
In order to get investment flowing in a sustainable way, it is important to have 
access to the right forms of finance, into the right infrastructure, and at the 
right time. Delay is dangerous in the sense that (i) the longer we wait to 
reduce emissions, the harder it is to remove them, and (ii) the more expensive 
it will be, which could crowd out valuable options. At the same time, 
infrastructure is long-lived and so investment decisions made now will cast 
long shadows: for example, energy infrastructure can last for perhaps 35 or 
more years. Getting investment decisions wrong by investing in the wrong 
(high-carbon) infrastructure could jeopardise meaningful action. 
Fortunately, there is no shortage of sustainable investment opportunities, and 
now is exactly the time to invest for low-carbon growth. In many developed 
countries, the private sector is sitting on record levels of savings and liquidity 
and long-term real interest rates are low. Many resources are unemployed or 
                                            
29
 See, e.g., Ahmad and Stern (1991); GCEC (2014a, ch 5); Lockwood (2013; 2015); and 
Green (2015). 
22 
 
under-employed. They can be invested in activities and infrastructure that 
have strong economic and social rates of return and a long-term future. 
The needed investments will be increasingly reliant on trustworthy domestic 
institutions and stable, long-term policy frameworks. Domestic institutions and 
policies in recipient countries are important to facilitate smoother access to 
private capital and overseas public financial assistance, and to increase the 
flow of public financial assistance over time in donor countries (e.g. as a 
proportion of rising carbon taxes or carbon permit auctions over time).  
In these discussions, one critical element related to perceived riskiness of 
infrastructure investment is the cost of capital; that is, from an investor point of 
view, the cost of providing financing to an infrastructure project. For newer 
and more innovative types of green infrastructure projects more generally, the 
cost of capital is particularly sensitive to and dependent on government policy, 
which can introduce risk into decisions. The cost of capital of more 
innovative/sustainable projects tend to be higher because there is a greater 
perception of policy risk and investors may have less experience in financing 
such projects. 
Public development banks, both national and international, have historically 
played an important role in mobilizing infrastructure development. In the 
transition to a low-carbon economy to date they have been critical (Mazzucato 
2013), and they are likely to continue to be so. The presence of a national or 
multinational development bank can lower the cost of capital in an investment 
by reducing the perceived policy and governmental risks, for instance, as 
governments are less likely to change policy if a public entity has committed to 
a major project with a long time horizon. They can also provide financial 
products, convene parties, and provide specialist knowledge and other 
capabilities. And they have a wide range of experience with innovative risk-
sharing instruments and dealing with complex infrastructure sectors, 
particularly in the energy, transport and industrial sectors — sectors that will 
receive a great deal of attention in the next 20–30 years. As a benchmark of 
the role of development banks, the UK Green Investment Bank is unique in 
that it will only target infrastructure to ‘green’ and profitable projects; lending 
on commercial terms but bringing with it lower risks and crowding in private 
capital.  
ii) Financing sustainable development: the role of Paris (December) in 
relation to Addis (July) 
In Copenhagen (COP15) in 2009, and later embodied in decisions made in 
Cancun (COP16), developed countries agreed to collectively mobilise 
US$100 billion per year by 2020, from both public and private sources, for the 
purpose of financing climate change mitigation and adaptation in developing 
countries. The financial flows that will result from this initiative are significant, 
but are dwarfed by the funds (i.e. the US$6 trillion per year) required to put the 
world on a path to a sustainable, low-carbon and resilient economy.  
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A critical question is how the financial aspects of the agreement in Paris can 
complement and add to agreements shaped in Addis Ababa in July 
concerning the financing of sustainable development goals (SDGs, which are 
under preparation for agreement in September 2015 in New York) in the 
context of the need for very large infrastructure investments over the next 15 
years. The climate finance should be complementary to the finance for SDGs 
in a way that further enhances the sustainability aspects of the latter, and 
additional in the senses outlined below.  
With regard to complementarity, there is clear and strong recognition in the 
draft SDGs of the importance of sustainability. Indeed the word “sustainable” 
appears in 11 of the 17 draft goals. In addition, the word “resilient” is used in 
connection with infrastructure and cities. Further, goal 13 (without the word 
sustainable) says explicitly “take urgent action to combat climate change and 
its impacts”. Thus Paris climate finance should be defined in the context of a 
very clear emphasis on climate and sustainability in the SDGs. 
With regard to additionality, the UN/Paris climate finance could be additional 
to the SDG finance in the following four ways (Stern 2015b). First, it could 
generate specific projects and programmes that would not have otherwise 
materialized. Second, it could generate projects and programmes in areas of 
activity that wouldn’t have otherwise been strongly covered in SDGs (possibly 
including adaptation and forests). Third, it could mobilise new sources of 
finances that would not otherwise have been forthcoming or available such as 
a slice of carbon taxation revenue (see, e.g., UN Secretary-General’s High-
Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing, which reported in 2010). 
And fourth, it could raise the scale of overall ODA resources for climate which 
is additional to what has been previously committed to development. 
Furthermore, the Paris agreement could oblige or encourage parties to work 
with their national development/infrastructure banks and international financial 
institutions (as recipients or donors, as appropriate) to shift investments away 
from high-carbon investments and into low-carbon, climate-resilient 
investments, and to report on their progress in doing so (Morgan et al. 
2014).30  
f) Innovation 
We noted earlier the critical role of innovation in creating new technological 
and social possibilities, and in bringing down their costs over time. Public and 
private investments in innovation are the main reason some low/zero-carbon 
technologies are cheaper than their high-carbon incumbents at current 
prices.31 However, innovation in general is hampered by market failures along 
                                            
30
 Reporting could be under the Convention and based on guidelines to be negotiated, but 
could be based on ongoing work by the World Bank and International Development Finance 
Club (IDFC). 
31
 New technologies typically follow a downward-sloping ‘cost curve’: as demand for the 
technologies grows and more units are deployed, costs fall as a result of economies of scale 
(fixed costs per unit of output fall) and ‘learning by doing’ (efficiencies and cost reductions are 
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the innovation chain.32 Low-carbon innovation is further undermined by its 
particularly high capital requirements (especially for low-carbon energy 
generation) and by the mispricing of many existing goods and services central 
to climate change (especially the under-pricing of GHG emissions33).34 The 
global case for strong policies and investments in low-carbon innovation is 
therefore very strong (GCEC 2014a; Stern 2015a). Strong policies and 
investments in innovation are also likely to facilitate increasingly higher 
ambition from countries of the kind that is needed to close the mitigation gap. 
Yet low-carbon innovation is currently dangerously underfunded and 
underdone around the world. In particular, there is a major shortfall in the 
research and development (and demonstration) of clean energy technologies 
in both the public and private sector. Public energy R&D in IEA member states 
was around US$12 billion in 2012 (IEA 2014c, figure 1.22) — less than half 
what it was in real terms in the late 1970s (GCEC 2014a, ch 7). Were we able 
to add in non-IEA members, worldwide energy R&D might be of the order of 
US$20 billion per year. Worldwide, publicly funded research, development 
and demonstration on renewable energy is only about US$4 billion a year.35 
This is not an area where the data allow us to be precise, but the general 
conclusion is clear: given the challenges we face, on climate change, energy 
insecurity, energy poverty, and air pollution, investments in energy R&D (and 
demonstration) — especially for renewable energy — are far too low (Stern 
2015a). 
The case for individual countries to support low-carbon innovation (e.g. 
through subsidies or direct government financing) is also likely to be strong, 
given the potential for high local knowledge spillovers, as discussed earlier. 
Nonetheless, there is a good case for greater international coordination on 
low-carbon innovation, since some of the public benefits from innovation do 
spill-over into other countries, and since greater coordination could increase 
efficiencies through specialisation, scale and network effects (IEA 2012; 
GCEC 2014a, ch 7; Aghion et al. 2014).  
                                                                                                                             
discovered along the supply chain through the experience gained from producing the new 
technology as companies experiment and compete with one another for market share). Policy 
interventions — such as feed-in-tariffs and renewable energy targets — can provide, and in 
many cases have provided, the demand for available renewable energy technologies that are 
at the higher end of their cost curves.  
32
 These include: positive externalities; public goods aspects of knowledge/technology; 
imperfections in capital markets and risk-sharing; network infrastructure; and coordination 
problems. The problems associated with underinvestment can become more acute as 
technologies proceed into development, demonstration and early scale commercial 
deployment, just as the need for capital increases — the so-called “valley of death”. 
33
 In addition to the under-pricing of GHG emissions, these include the mispricing of: natural 
capital and ecosystem services; energy (in)security; worker health and safety issues 
associated with fossil fuels; public health impacts of fossil fuels (especially air and water 
pollution); amenity impacts of fossil fuels; and natural resource scarcity and rents. 
34
 The OECD and IEA have thus described low-carbon technology R&D as “twice a public 
good” (Philibert 2004); they could have gone further than “twice”.  
35
 IEA (2013b, table 5.2 and figure 5.3). For figures on India and China, see Kempener, 
Anadon, and Condor (2010).  
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In light of these realities, international cooperation on low-carbon innovation 
could valuably include the following (Green 2014): 
 scaled-up public R&D funding, in the form of increased national funding 
coordinated internationally and, where appropriate, collaborative 
international partnerships — recognising that the latter can be complex 
(Anadon et al. 2011, ch 5; de Coninck et al. 2008). The Global 
Commission on the Economy and Climate (2014a) has argued that the 
governments of the major economies should at least triple their 
investment in the R&D of clean energy technologies, with the aim of 
exceeding 0.1% of GDP per country, and should better coordinate the 
direction of these investments.36 
 public-private regional networks focused on the development and 
demonstration of new and locally-adapted technologies and processes 
(GCEC 2014a); 
 promoting public institutions and funding mechanisms to mobilise 
public venture capital for green innovators with high growth potential 
(Mazzucato 2013; Mazzucato and Perez 2014); and  
 expanded and better coordinated deployment support policies, such as 
feed-in tariffs and renewable energy obligations (IEA 2012). 
Importantly, these institutions should reflect the diverse needs and capabilities 
of different types of countries. High income countries should focus more on 
frontier innovation, and other countries more on adaptive innovation and 
diffusion of new technologies and processes (Aghion et al. 2014).  
The specific initiatives concerning innovation outlined above would be more 
suitably pursued outside the UN climate process, including by smaller 
groupings of states and non-state actors. However, the Paris conference 
could provide a political opportunity to advance and announce such initiatives, 
i.e. “on the side” of the formal process in Paris. As much as is possible, the 
Paris agreement could valuably acknowledge the factual context, principles 
and specific commitments concerning innovation discussed here.  
5. Conclusion 
The Paris climate conference provides an important opportunity to advance 
global cooperation toward a low-carbon future that greatly mitigates climate 
risks and helps countries adapt to those risks already locked-in. This paper 
has highlighted the keys to successful international climate cooperation in 
Paris and beyond.  
The key conclusions and lessons from this paper are as follows:  
 If international climate cooperation is to succeed in Paris and beyond, 
parties need to forge a shared understand of the scale of the emissions 
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reduction task, the likely “emissions gap”, the opportunities, benefits 
and attractiveness of many potential responses to climate change (e.g. 
strong and better quality economic growth), and the technical and 
political barriers that impede those responses from emerging, despite 
their attractiveness. 
 Based on this understanding, there are certain key goals, principles, 
policies and institutions for action and collaboration that should be 
embedded in the Paris agreement and developed more widely at the 
international and domestic level, including — 
o A shared long-term goal to reduce emissions to net zero within 
the second half of this century, and associated medium term 
goals concerning the decarbonisation of electricity, the phase-
out of unabated coal-fired power generation, and a moratorium 
on new coal mines and mine extensions; 
o A process for the regular review and upward revision of 
commitments under the Paris agreement, and other provisions 
to ensure the agreement reflects the dynamic and attractive 
nature of the transition to a low-carbon and climate-resilient 
world, including provisions related to equity; 
o Institutions (especially multilateral and state development banks) 
to lower the cost of capital for financing clean infrastructure, in 
the context of the US$6 trillion per year infrastructure finance 
needs of the global economy over the next 15 years, the 
financing of Sustainable Development Goals, and the US$100 
billion per year climate finance to be mobilised through the UN 
climate process; and 
o Enhanced state support and well-designed institutions for clean 
innovation. 
The prize of successful international climate cooperation is a much more 
attractive and dynamic form of economic growth and development that 
creates a much healthier environment for people everywhere, overcomes 
poverty, and can be sustained over the long term. An agreement in Paris can 
play a very important role in signaling to the world that this is the future 
direction of the global economy, and in accelerating concrete initiatives to 
achieve it. We can and we must get it right.  
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